PHP/PERL/Ruby exploit
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markdown/2006-02-09-php-perl-ruby-exploit.md
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markdown/2006-02-09-php-perl-ruby-exploit.md
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<!--# set var="title" value="PHP/PERL/Ruby exploit" -->
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<!--# set var="date" value="February 9, 2006" -->
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<!--# include file="include/top.html" -->
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Take the __PHP__ code:
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<?php
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$filename = ‘content/’.$_REQUEST[’filename’].’.html’;
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include($filename);
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?>
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This is exploitable in an obvious way; “../” can be included in the filename, and it can be used to open any file ending in “.html” that’s readable by the web user. However, there’s a second, less obvious exploit path.
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If magic\_quotes\_gpc is off, the following is possible:
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test.php?filename=../../../../../../etc/passwd%00
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PHP stores strings internally as binary-safe, but the include() requires a syscall, which expects a nil-terminated string. The result is that the syscall considers the string over at the \0, and opens /etc/passwd. PHP should really check to see if the binary-safe string contains nils before the syscall, and fail with an error if it does.
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---
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In __PERL__:
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open IN,”foo\0bar”;
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causes the syscall:
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open(”foo”, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE)
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---
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In __Ruby__:
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File.open(”foo\0bar”,’r');
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causes the syscall:
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open(”foo”, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE)
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---
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__Python__ appears to be safe:
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open(”foo\0bar”,”r”);
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throws an error:
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TypeError: file() argument 1 must be (encoded string without NULL bytes), not str
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<!--# include file="include/bottom.html" -->
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